In R v. Spiteri above, in a serious sexual assault case, the Appellant testified that she was pushed to the ground by the Complainant, who sat on her stomach and held her hands on the floor with her left hand on her head while inserting a bottle into her vagina with her right hand; He then let go of his hands and had penis sex with her while she stayed on the ground. The complainant`s DNA was identified in the semen of her vagina, and her fingerprints were identified on a vial found in the area. He stated that the complainant herself inserted the vial into her vagina and then invited him to have sex. However, he disputed the evidence that he had held the complainant`s hands with his left hand on the ground above her head, stating that approximately three months earlier he had seriously injured his left hand and was still severely disabled in his left arm at the time of the trial, which prevented him from physically: detain the complainant in the manner described by the complainant. His proof was that he still could not put pressure on his left wrist at the time of the trial, and he made it clear to the jurors that even at the time of the trial (ten months after the sexual intercourse), he was still unable to work. He was cross-examined by the Crown to indicate that he had done push-ups in the cells a few days before the trial, and he said he had tried, but failed. He said it was a complete lie to claim that he had done forty push-ups in the cells. The Crown obtained permission to ask a Correctional Services officer to prove that he had seen the complainant use both hands and wrists. The video recording of a surveillance camera in the complainant`s cell five days earlier had been put up for auction, showing him performing exercises as described by the officer.
In ALRC 102 at 12.29 p.m., it was suggested that if objections are raised to a line of cross-examination before its substantial impact on the credibility of a witness becomes apparent, it may be appropriate to conduct an examination pursuant to section 189 in the absence of the jury and the witness (the voir dire) so that the value can be disclosed without compromising the forensic technique of the cross-examiner. The opinion of the witness must be able to significantly influence the assessment of the credibility of the witness to whom it refers It is commonplace that the first point of contact for a judge who assesses the credibility of a witness` testimony on a certain point is to compare it with contemporary evidence that does not depend on human memory. Div 3 — Credibility of persons who are not witnesses (ss. 108A to 108B) Anderson et al., The New Law of Evidence, argue (at [101A.2]) that Pt 3.7 only works with respect to evidence relevant to credibility and which probably fulfills or fulfills one of the alternative descriptions of section 101A – that is, in categories A and C. Examples of character or personal errors that could weaken a person`s testimony include: Category A: Evidence is relevant only because it affects the assessment of a witness`s or person`s credibility Vacation obligation Section 104 applies only to “proof of credibility” within the meaning of section 101A. The defendant may be cross-examined on a matter relating to his solvency only if the court so authorizes. Prior to the enactment of An Act to amend the Evidence Act, authorization was required if the matter concerned only the issuance of the defendant`s credit; the admissibility of such evidence, which appeared in both an issue and the loan, did not require authorization: see, for example, R v. Spiteri (2004) 61 NSWLR 369 to [38] (which is only reproduced in [2004] NSWCCA 321 and discussed below). Unable to know the issues to which his testimony relates (paragraph 106(2)(d)): This evidence of the witness`s knowledge was admissible under the common law to demonstrate the objective unreliability of the witness`s testimony: Toohey v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1965] AC 595, at pp. 607-608; R v Rivkin [2004] NSWCCA 7 to [337] (reported other issues at (2004) 59 NSWLR 284).
However, Article 106 does not refute the witness` inability to recall the evidence, a question which Article 104(3)(b) expressly allows as the subject of cross-examination where it could significantly affect the assessment of the witness`s credibility. The Court of Criminal Appeal refused to read section 106(d) in a manner that would include both the inability to remember and the inability to know it: R v PLV (2001) 51 NSWLR 736 to [79]–[91]; R v Galea (2004) 148 A Crim R 220 to [98]. In Synclair v East Lancashire Hospital NHS Trust, the plaintiff told a doctor that his surgical stoma had changed colour. A medical note written by another assistant physician stated “normal color of the stoma.” The applicant insisted that this assistant physician was not present when he informed the first physician of the colour change. At paragraph 19, the judge said: n. whether the testimony is worth believing, based on the competence of the witness and the likelihood that it is true. Unless the testimony contradicts other known facts or is extremely unlikely based on human experience, the credibility test is purely subjective. (See: credible witness) This department fills an important gap in procedural law arising from the extensive exceptions to the hearsay rule, where the constructor of a representation admitted as evidence is not summoned to appear as a witness. The two sections are dealt with together.
The authors of The New Law of Evidence, 2nd ed., 2009, point out (in Article 108A.2) that since the credibility rule (§ 101A) applies only to a witness who testifies, this article now allows the admission of evidence if relevant to the dismissal, strengthening or restoration of the lender`s creditworthiness, even if he is not a witness. but only if the evidence could significantly influence the assessment of that person`s credibility (a formula that replaced the previous description of the evidence as having significant probative value). Paragraph 106(2)(d) was interpreted broadly and covered many aspects of reliability or credibility, including psychiatric, psychological or neurological considerations: R. v. Rivkin, above, at [335]. The declared intention of the ALRC was to subject evidence relevant to both credibility and a fact in question (but not admissible for the latter purpose) to the same rules as other evidence of credibility: ALRC Report 102 of 12.14. Recommendation 12-1 described the intention to ensure that the provisions of Pt 3.7 apply both to: (i) evidence that relates only to credibility and (ii) to evidence relevant to credibility and for another purpose but is not admissible because of the provisions of points 3.2 to 3.6 or that can be used for that purpose. Uniform Evidence Law (13th edition at [EA.108C.60]), correctly argued that Section 108C is essentially an exception to the credibility rule set out in Section 102.
The character of a witness is also considered whether their testimony could harm your case. No one is perfect, of course, but certain aspects of a person`s character can make their statements less reliable. The interpretation of article 103 is not discussed somewhat conclusively in R v. El-Azzi, above, at [177]–[183], [198]–[199], except to suggest that the High Court in Stanoevski v. The Queen (2001) 202 CLR 115 had refused to “harmonize” pt 3.7 (credibility) and pt 3.8 (character):see Stanoevski at [38]. However, character is relevant to credibility: R v Murphy (1985) 4 NSWLR 42-54; Melbourne v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR 1 to [30], [72]–[76], [120], [152], [200], and refer to Pt 3.8 (character).