The CPA, a college of arbitrators, emerged as an alternative to wars and arms races in Europe at the noon of colonialism. Later, in 1922, the PCIJ was founded to deal with the ad hoc nature of hybrid courts prior to the First World War. However, permanent courts and ad hoc tribunals have not recognized colonialism as the Achilles` heel of international law. The interwar bourgeoisie financed the shadow writing of apathetic legal methods and capitalist norms in transnational languages to protect foreign investors. After 1945, the continuity of the structure of colonial legal arguments prevented them from questioning their essentialist ontology and capitalist teleology. As such, the ICJ was initially indifferent to the colonial question. In the ensuing Cold War, former colonial powers refused to accept ICJ jurisdiction, with the United States questioning the integrity of individual judges. In disputes arising from the violation of colonial concession treaties, investor–state tribunals charged new sovereigns for the costs of developing legal norms. Normative writings in favour of the development of judicial laws and the proposed interweaving of investor protection with human rights continue to fuel the Eurocentrism of international law. A hypernormative theory of legislation by international courts and tribunals remains decidedly indifferent to both the rational electoral approach and Third World science. This article examines the ontology and teleology of international judicial law. The global financial crisis of 2007-2010 reopened the debate on the reform of the international monetary and financial system.
This well-argued book shows the strategic role of international economic law (IEL) in ensuring international monetary stability and global financial stability. After discussing the current distribution of power among the institutions of the IEL, Annamaria Viterbo focuses on monetary measures: exchange rate restrictions, capital controls and exchange rate manipulation. These three fundamental themes are then examined through the prism of a multi-level methodology, adopting perspectives from international monetary law, commercial law and investment law. The author assesses how horizontal sectors into which EIEL is traditionally divided interact and how conflicts between norms are avoided or resolved. Particular attention is also paid to the outcome of trade and investment disputes over monetary measures. International Economic Law and Monetary Measures is aimed at specialists in international trade law and international financial law, as well as students of law and economics. Lawyers and officials working in the field of international business law will find it a useful reference, as well as legal advisers in banks and financial institutions, international investors and multinational companies. Contents: Introduction 1. International monetary stability and global financial stability as global public goods and the role of international economic law 2. The Bretton Woods Institutions and their Role in the Delivery of Global Public Goods: Focusing on International Monetary Stability 3. The Global Financial Architecture: Towards a Strengthened Institutional Framework for Global Financial Stability? 4.
Exchange restrictions and capital controls within the IMF legal framework 5. Exchange restrictions and capital controls in the WTO legal framework 6. Exchange restrictions and capital controls in international investment law 7. Exchange rate manipulation in the index of international economic law Ladies and gentlemen, for my inaugural speech tonight, I have chosen a theme that addresses the burning issues of managing globalization in the world is currently preoccupied. I will address the issues of human rights and development of the Third World in the era of globalization, global economic governance and how globalization poses an enormous challenge to traditional international law as we know it. We will also seek a just global legal order that manages globalization well and makes it work equitably for all for a better future. The objective of this article is to critically analyse the methodology and impact of the investment chapter proposed by the European Union (EU) for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). It focuses on the innovations of an Appellate Body and the inclusion of a “regulatory law” provision, as well as the very similar general exceptions to GATT Article XX. Given that these features have been replicated in CETA and the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, why is the EU changing the traditional form of investor–state arbitration into a preferential trade and investment agreement, and if the EU model is viable and formulated on a robust design that will stand the test of time? Semi-finalist of the Global Challenges Foundation Educators` Challenge Award, Sweden Sustainability, 2018, Vol.10/11, 4022; available in OPEN ACCESS format here: www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/11/4022 In the past, various attempts to create a multilateral treaty to protect foreign investment have failed. However, researchers have attempted to fill the void with theoretical arguments that bilateral investment treaties create a multilateral normative framework even in the absence of a multilateral treaty.
This framework imposes disciplines external to States. These theoretical arguments have no basis in the text of the treaty and lead to an extension of the scope of the standards of treatment provided for in bilateral investment treaties (BITs).